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In a Monetary Union where individual monetary instruments are lost, ￿scal policy becomes
more important as a national policy. The question addressed in this article is whether ￿scal policy
should be decided at the country level or by a central decision maker, being in any case the ￿scal
instruments speci￿c to each country. To answer this question, the focus is on the quantitative
e⁄ect, since there are costs of implementing a supranational decision maker. While discussing
the methodologies used in literature, we hereby propose a di⁄erent one for quantifying gains from
cooperation. We conclude that gains from ￿scal coordination are signi￿cative, but gains that result
from policy changes as a reaction to shocks are, by nature, very small. We also show that, symmetric
shocks lead to coordination gains of the same magnitude than asymmetric ones.
1 Introduction
When considering a Monetary Union, where monetary instruments are no longer an option at the
country level, the importance of ￿scal policy surfaces. An important issue to address is whether or not
it is bene￿cial to coordinate such policies. Considering that the implementation of a supranational
institution for ￿scal policy implies signi￿cant costs, it is paramount to measure quantitatively those
coordination gains. Moreover, most of the literature focuses on the loss of the stabilization role of
national policies with the introduction of a monetary union and, therefore, the main issue becomes
measuring welfare gains derived from ￿scal policy coordination, which takes on the role of speci￿c
stabilization intruments.
This paper quanti￿es the increase in welfare within a Monetary Union following the introduction
of a jointly decided ￿scal policy. Going beyond the construction of a detailed model which could be
a faithful replica of the past behavior of reality, on one hand it intends to build up a methodological
approach. On the other hand, by understanding the main channels in a quite simple environment,
those quantitative results can then be extended to any other environment. We decompose the ￿scal
coordination gain into two fundamental e⁄ects: the deterministic e⁄ect and the stochastic e⁄ect. The
deterministic gain measures the increase in welfare deriving from a change of the steady-state. We call
stochastic gain the one that corresponds to the increase in welfare from a di⁄erent reaction to shocks.
This last component is related with the one computed in the literature. We ￿nd that, by nature, this
stochastic e⁄ect is always very small, by a measure developed in the article.
￿E-mail address: ssalvado@fe.unl.pt
yThe present work is part of my PhD research. I would like to thank Prof. Isabel Horta Correia for her comments
and suggestions.
1The model used is standard in the literature, except on the monetary transmission. We consider
that each country produces a composite good that is traded among countries, that ￿rms produce these
goods using labor (that is immobile across countries) and we consider that linear technology is subject
to shocks. Additionally, each government￿ s consumption is limited to nationally produced goods and
is ￿nanced by a distortionary tax on labor income. Households have a cash-in-advance constraint on
the purchase of both goods. As regards debt, we consider that private debt is state-contingent and
non-traded internationally and public debt is noncontingent and can be traded across countries.
This model inherits the four characteristics that Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002), Corsetti and Pesenti
(2004) and Canzoneri and Diba (2005) describe as the characteristics that make a model tractable.
That is, a log utility on consumption, constant expenditure shares on components of the composite
consumption good, a cash in advance constraint (or a log speci￿cation of the utility of money in their
cases) and a balanced current account1. Notice however, that not being crucial to impose in the
methodology considered in this article, we use them for simplicity reasons.
We assume a monetary union comprised of two countries, where ￿scal policy is implemented at a
domestic level. As regards monetary policy, given that our objective is to quantify the e⁄ect of the ￿scal
policy, and in order to simplify the strategic interactions, we consider that the common monetary policy
is implemented independently from individual ￿scal policies. By ￿scal policy we mean that domestic
governments levy tax labor income for the purpose of ￿nancing public consumption which, in turn,
will provide domestic economic agents with added utility. Notice that in this model, a direct relation
between tax proceeds and government expenditures can be can established. Therefore, considering
tax rates or public expenditure as the ￿scal instrument is irrelevant for the analysis.
To implement ￿scal policy in an independent manner, one country￿ s government does not take into
account the e⁄ect of its actions on the other country￿ s government policy. Hence, our main objective
is to compare the welfare level from this strategic behavior with the scenario where ￿scal policy is
implemented in a coordinated manner, i.e. where ￿scal policy is decided by a supranational authority
albeit implemented with individual national instruments. The di⁄erence between coordinated and
non-coordinated ￿scal policy derives from the fact that both countries have a strategic behavior in
changing terms of trade when ￿scal policy is implemented at a central level. Coordination gains exist,
because in a coordination scenario each country has an incentive to reduce the level of labor e⁄ort and
can do so by increasing the tax rate on labor, which is the same as increasing government expenditures.
When one country increases its tax rate, the terms of trade increase and the partner country su⁄ers
a decline on the relative price of the good it produces, creating an incentive to increase the tax rate.
When every country behaves this way, there is no impact in the terms of trade and given higher taxes
it generates ine¢ cient results.
As regards coordination gains, the literature of the 80￿ s concerned deterministic static models and
gains were driven by spillovers that occurred every single period. However, with the development of
dynamic stochastic models, authors began to also study cyclical e⁄ects. As such, coordination gains
were measured as a consequence of countries￿reaction to shocks. The ￿rst studies concerned monetary
1That derives from the fact that we consider that each country holds an initial zero amount of debt.
2policy, being ￿scal policy coordination a secondary issue. They approached issues like ￿ exible exchange
rates versus ￿xed exchange rates, or the extent to which a coordinated monetary policy could react
to individual country shocks.
In the beginning of the year 2000 and mainly due to the formation of the European Monetary
Union, the literature started to focus on the role of ￿scal policy. The main question was how, in
the context of a Monetary Union, ￿scal policy should react to shocks. Some studies focused on
optimal ￿scal policy. Others, proposed ￿scal rules that could replicate some target and could be easily
implemented at the country level. Coordination of ￿scal policy is also an issue present in this branch
of the literature. However, a question arrises which is not usually debated: how much are the gains
from ￿scal policy coordination? Moreover, which measure should be used to answer this question?
As it is going to be explained in the next section, in the literature we can ￿nd di⁄erent methodolo-
gies which, if applied to the same framework, would deliver di⁄erent results. In this paper we clarify
those di⁄erences and suggest a more general methodology to measure gains from ￿scal cooperation.
This methodology can be used in the standard models of the literature and is not based in any kind
of a priori approximation, delivering a more accurate result of the quanti￿cation of the coordination
gain.
This paper is organized as follows. After debating methodology issues, we describe the model
which is used to test such methodology. For simplicity, we ￿rst apply it to a model with ￿ exible prices
and then to one where ￿rms set their prices one period in advance. We also consider that the only
source of disturbance comes from shocks on technology. Afterwards, we compute welfare di⁄erences
from a equilibrium where ￿scal policy is decided by a common authority (the cooperative equilibrium)
to a equilibrium where ￿scal instruments are chosen at the country level (the Nash equilibrium). The
welfare di⁄erence between these two equilibria is the gain from ￿scal cooperation. Additionally, we
decompose this gain in two e⁄ects: the deterministic e⁄ect and the one that occurs due to shocks.
We show that, out of the ￿rst best, deterministic ￿scal coordination gains are always signi￿cative,
representing an increase of more than 16% on average utility. Notice that, in line with the conclusions
of Chari and Kehoe (1990), this result represents a lower boundary of the gains￿magnitude as it is
derived with only two economies. They show that when the number of economies increase and taxes
are distorting, the wedge between the cooperative and the Nash equilibrium diverges, increasing the
gains from cooperation.
On the other hand, we show that stochastic gains are, on average, small, representing less than 2%
of the total gains. Despite the small magnitude of the stochastic gains, we also show that symmetric
technology shocks lead to coordination gains with the same magnitude of asymmetric ones with similar
mean. As the mean of the distribution of shocks is unaltered and we are considering that prices are
set one period in advance, the reaction of one given country to a shock is independent from the other
country￿ s shock. Ex-ante, countries do not have the information of the shock that is going to happen,
therefore tax rates in every country depend just on the shock of that country.
Hence, we can conclude that ￿scal policy coordination should be considered in order to achieve
a higher long-term welfare level, but it is not appealing as a short-run device for reacting to shocks.
3Notice that this conclusion corroborates the earlier idea of Lucas (1988), where he claims that, for
plausible risk aversion levels, stabilization gains are always small. Therefore, in our example, given the
risk aversion levels considered, stabilization gains would not be very signi￿cative even if the possibility
of accounting for a total stabilization of the e⁄ects of the shock existed. As considered by Lucas, the
use of stabilization policies to reduce aggregate risks is not su¢ cient to eliminate all the risk that
occurs at the individual level and those are not taken into account in the aggregated model used in
this article.
2 Methodology
When comparing and evaluating the di⁄erent methodologies used throughout the literature it is
common to begin by a benchmark case where model speci￿cities lead, not only to the elimination of
gains from coordination, but also to a ￿rst best equilibria. This is important since this is an issue that
is applied across methodologies.
As explained in Salvado (2009), to eliminate gains from cooperation that are derived by strategic
interactions among countries and to achieve e¢ cient results, the usual procedure is to neutralize a
given distortion with another one. In the literature, where the source of the gain is in general generated
by the existence of monopolistic competition, a subsidy on production is imposed to eliminate that
distortion. However, as proposed in Salvado (2009), this non-cooperative-gains solution is just achieved
in special conditions, that does not depend on the imposition of the labor subsidy per se. As such, it
is proved that in the case of endogenous government expenditures, only when imposing consumption
taxes and an unitary elasticity of substitution among goods, it is obtained a situation of inexistence of
cooperative gains. Moreover, when lump-sum transfers are considered (which is the case throughout
monetary policy literature), might coordination achieve e¢ ciency.
However, when studying ￿scal policy, it is worth analyzing these issues in more detail. Generally,
in the literature it is assumed that government expenditures are endogenous. Moreover, the use of
the labor subsidy to cancel monopolistic distortions is not su¢ cient to achieve a situation without
coordination gains since the subsidy used in the cooperative case will be di⁄erent from the one used
in the Nash case which, per se, will be a source of distortion that is going to generate a coordination
gain.
Additionally, in the majority of the models, the equality between the Nash, the cooperative and
the First Best is appealing in order to consider the ￿ exible price case as a benchmark. As known,
the deterministic steady-state of a model with sticky pricing is equivalent to the deterministic steady-
state of a model with ￿ exible prices. Therefore, in a model where the cooperative equilibrium, the
Nash equilibrium and the First Best coincide in the steady-state, the ￿ exible price case can be a good
benchmark.
Linked to coordination gains, the expression "stabilization gains" is recurrent in this kind of
literature and has often di⁄erent meanings from one paper to another, raising two issues. First, it is
important to clarify the exact scope of the expression and how it relates to the "coordination gains"
expression. Second, it is also important to understand how such gains are measured, that is, what is
4the underlying methodology.
To answer these questions, we decompose the expected value of the Union￿ s utility into two parts:





steady state + f (￿) (1)
where UU
steady state represents the deterministic e⁄ect, that is, the Union￿ s utility that is generated
in the steady-state of the model, and f (￿), the stochastic e⁄ect, that represents the utility that is
generated due to a distribution of shocks. Notice that, the stochastic e⁄ect accounts to the direct
e⁄ect of shocks and to an indirect e⁄ect, that occurs due to the impact of the volatility of shocks in
the mean of the utility.
This decomposition allow us to easily compare and understand the di⁄erent methodologies present
in the literature. Notice that this decomposition is independent from coordination issues, since it is
just a decomposition of the expected value of a variable that, in this case, is the utility of the Union,
but could be the utility of a given country. However, applied to the di⁄erence between utility from
coordination and non-coordination, gives us a measure of gains from coordination.
Another advantage of our method is that can be used with models that include distortionary taxa-
tion. Notice that, in the literature, distortionary taxation is not used because it implies an additional
level of complexity. However, to our method the use of distortionary taxation is not a limitation.
Moreover, as we explained previously, we consider two distinct situations: one, where countries in the
Union choose their ￿scal policy on their own (our Nash equilibrium) and, an other, where the ￿scal
policy is decided by an authority at the union level (our cooperative equilibrium). Then, welfare gains
from moving from the Nash equilibrium to the cooperative equilibrium, are computed in the two cases.
First, we consider the deterministic steady-states of the Nash and the cooperative equilibrium and
we compute the welfare gain that occurs in the steady-state. We name it the deterministic gain.
Second, we compute the gain that occurs considering a stochastic economy. Again, we compute
the optimal welfare in the cooperative equilibrium and in the Nash equilibrium. From the di⁄erence
of the two we obtain the total coordination gain.
As we do not have a closed solution for our model, the description of the Nash problem is not
of direct formulation, specially given the particulars of the models used. Gali and Monacelli (2005),
Forlati (2007), among others, consider that countries integrated in a monetary union are too small to
in￿ uence the terms of trade. Therefore, in the description of the Nash problem, they only consider
the restrictions on equilibrium regarding each country and the conditions for the market clearing of
goods. Conversely, in the present paper, we consider that the union is composed by two countries
with the same weight and thus they have the ability to change the terms of trade with their actions,
generating strategic interactions which, otherwise, would not take place. This way, in the description
of the Nash equilibrium, we consider that both countries are restricted by all the conditions that
describe the equilibrium. Therefore, the key is to consider as restrictions to both problems (Nash and
Cooperative) all the conditions that de￿ne the equilibrium.
Finally, the stochastic gain is computed by eliminating the deterministic gain from the total gain. It
represents the gain that is derived by a distribution of exogenous shocks that move around the optimal
5steady-states. It is worth mentioning that, as our deterministic gain is computed by di⁄erences in the
two optimal steady-states (the coordinated and the Nash one), our stochastic gain measures the true




















deterministic e⁄ect pure stochastic e⁄ect
The advantage of this decomposition comes from the fact that our deterministic e⁄ect is measured
taking into consideration the variations in welfare derived from di⁄erences that emerge from the
steady-state of the two optimal policies (cooperative and Nash). Hence, our deterministic e⁄ect does
not take into consideration changes in the steady-state that would occur via changes in the volatility of
Union￿ s utility. Therefore, it captures the true e⁄ect that follows only from the strategic interactions
of countries without any type of distortions that would occur in a stochastic environment. Moreover,
this e⁄ect of the volatility in the mean is considered in the stochastic gain.
The objective of this section is to compare our methodology to the di⁄erent ones used in the
literature. Therefore, and for the purpose of explanation, we divide the literature into two major
groups: one that is based in models that allow for a closed form solution and other that is based on
numerical approximations.
Within the closed-solution models, there is a sub-group2 that assumes that shocks have a lognormal
distribution. In conjunction with some restrictions on functional forms, this hypothesis generates
endogenous variables which are lognormally distributed. We call this methodology the "Lognormal
Distribution Method". In this literature, in addition to having a closed form solution, that only
depends on the exogenous variables and policy instruments, they allow for a particular case of the
decomposition made in condition 2. The stabilization e⁄ect is in this case equivalent to the stochastic
e⁄ect. Moreover, with this kind of models, volatility directly in￿ uences the expected value of a variable,
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(3)
mean e⁄ect stochastic e⁄ect
being UU the mean and ￿2 the variance of the distribution.
The key fact is that it leads to lognormal distributed endogenous variables, which implies a very
strong restriction in the structure of the models.
In this group of the literature, to our knowledge, it is rare to introduce ￿scal policy, with the
analysis being limited to monetary policy.
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(2002) create the grounds for some of the more recent work. In an environment
with money in the utility function3, where asset markets are incomplete - as well as e¢ cient risk
2In other sub-group, we ￿nd the work of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), where they use the mentioned four characteristics
that allow for a closed form solution of the model, in addition to lump-sum taxes. They analyze monetary and ￿scal
transmission mechanisms and conclude that the welfare e⁄ects of an expansionary policy are driven from monopolistic
distortions in production supply and in a country incentive to in￿ uence terms of trade. However, they do not quantify
these e⁄ects.
3However, they eliminate the monetary cost making the parameter associated to money in the utility function tend
to zero (￿ ! 0).
6sharing in consumption of tradeable goods, wages set one period in advance, ￿ exible prices, and where
monetary policy is de￿ned by a simple rule for each country4, - two types of gains are analyzed:
stabilization and cooperation. The stabilization gain corresponds to ￿the gain from monetary policies
that target ￿ exible-wage equilibrium compared with policies that hold money supply constant￿ . The
cooperation gain corresponds to ￿the gain from moving from an independent monetary policy to a
cooperative monetary policy￿ . They show that the optimal cooperative policy is the one that replicates
the ￿ exible-wage allocation that, by its turn, is constrained Pareto e¢ cient ex-ante. Moreover, they
separate the e⁄ects between the various risk-aversion levels. They conclude that stabilization gains
decrease with the risk-aversion level, given that for higher levels of ￿5, a lower adjustment in wages
is necessary, and coordination gains are much smaller6. Notwithstanding the above, when the utility
function is logarithmic in consumption (￿ = 1), they conclude that stabilization gains represent 1:01%
of output, and no coordination gains exist. In other words, the Nash equilibrium is the same as the
cooperative equilibrium which, in turn, is not a ￿rst best. Notice that this result occurs because,
as they are analyzing monetary interactions without costs of holding money, they do not have the
distortionary e⁄ects of taxes and they do not allow for country strategic interactions via monopolistic
distortions.
More recently, Evers (2007) using the same environment as Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ but introducing a
cash in advance constraint, considers that monetary policy can be implemented with two instruments
which are demonstrated to be independent: by setting the nominal interest rate and by establishing
rules for the money supply. By studying of the monetary policy interactions, this author concludes
that gains driven by the money supply rule create second-order e⁄ects, that is, in the variance, and that
coordination gains originated in the interest-rate side (derived from incentives to manipulate terms of
trade) are in the unconditional mean. That is, money supply a⁄ects the terms of trade by changing
the nominal exchange rate ex-post and it is used to decrease macro variability. Nominal interest rate
a⁄ects the terms of trade by changing expected in￿ ation ex-ante, which leads to an ine¢ cient in￿ ation
tax that reduces the average welfare. Hence, he concludes that, in a situation of low trade and when
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 1=2, coordination gains represent 0:217% of consumption
equivalents, decomposed in 0:155% from the mean e⁄ect and 0:062% from the stochastic e⁄ect. Notice
that Evers, by giving a dual objective to monetary policy, has two instruments that can be used in
two distinct policies. Therefore, monetary policy can account for both the variability of prices and
in￿ ation.
Canzoneri and Diba (2005) use a similar setup of Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002). As they impose
a log utility of consumption, a log speci￿cation of the utility of money, constant expenditure shares
and a balanced current account, the model does not generate any terms-of-trade externalities. Hence,
the ￿ exible price solution does not account for any monetary coordination gains. However, as they
relax the hypothesis that productivity shocks are perfectly correlated, the Nash equilibrium no longer
achieves the ￿ exible price solution, which generates coordination gains. Therefore, they conclude that
4In this rule the monetary instrument is money supply, where the stochastic component can react to world shocks
(symmetric) and to asymmetric shocks.
5Being 1=￿ the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
6Notice that these results are consistent to the expected because monetary policy has a small impact on real activity.
7depending on the size and the correlation of shocks, coordination gains can be large.
Devereux and Engel (2003), in an economy where prices are set one period in advance, compare
the welfare of ￿xed and ￿ oating exchange-rate regimes depending on whether prices are set in the
currency of producers or consumers. They conclude that in the case of the producer currency pricing,
if exchange rates are ￿ exible (which is the same as a Nash equilibrium in monetary policy), a lower
consumption variance is generated. However, interest-rate volatility produces a lower (average) level of
consumption. In this case, using their terminology, monetary policy will generate stabilization losses
(in the variance) and coordination gains (in the mean).
In the second group of the literature we ￿nd standard Neo-Keynesian models which cannot be
solved analytically. Therefore, authors use di⁄erent numerical methods to solve those models. As they
are mainly interested in measuring the reaction to shocks, all variables are treated in deviations from
the steady-state. Therefore, it is clear that their aim is to study policies that react to shocks. When
they analyze coordination gains they call it stabilization gains, which can generate some confusion
between the two de￿nitions. As deterministic coordination is rarely considered, they measure the gain
that occur due to stabilization.
Notice that we would have a direct relation between this "stabilization gain" and the "stochastic
e⁄ect" if economies have su¢ cient instruments so as to cancel the changes in the mean driven from
volatility changes, which is not a regular procedure. Additionally, in Salvado (2009) we identify
speci￿c cases where the coordination gain driven from the steady-state does not exist, that is, when
the steady-state of the Nash equilibrium is the same as steady-state of the cooperative equilibrium.
However, regarding distortionary taxation, it is proved that those cases never reach e¢ ciency.
Within the set of papers that are based in numerical approximations, we ￿nd a branch in the
literature that uses the Linear Quadratic (LQ) Method. Here models are reduced to a small number
of equations in log-deviations (￿rst-order) and welfare is transformed in a loss function of second order,
following the Woodford method, 2003. They then use the second-order approximation of the model
equations to replace the linear terms in the loss function with quadratic terms.
f (x;y) ￿ f (x;y) ’ ￿1 (x ￿ x) + ￿2 (y ￿ y) + ￿1 (x ￿ x)
2 + ￿2 (y ￿ y)
2 )
) Loss = ￿1 (x ￿ x)




Subsequently, they minimize the quadratic loss function subject to linear constraints, implied by
the ￿rst order approximation to the model. This leads to a linear quadratic policy problem with an
analytical solution that is the linear approximation to the optimal policy function.
It is also worth mentioning that in the majority of this literature, the comparison between coordi-
nation and non-coordination is not analyzed, and the quanti￿cation of coordination gains is therefore
rare.
The original idea of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) was that, with ￿ exible prices, if monopolistic
distortions are compensated with any kind of production subsidy in the steady-state, the cooperative
equilibrium replicates the ￿rst best and coincides with the Nash equilibrium. Hence, ￿ exible prices are
8a good benchmark and are used as target of approximation. Notice that, any way, the stabilization
gains measured di⁄er from ours, and correspond instead to what we call pure stochastic gains.
In the second generation of this literature, equality of the three equilibria7 are not imposed and
some articles consider non-distortionary taxation, allowing for second-best equilibria. However, they
continue to use the ￿ exible price case as benchmark, not accounting for two problems. The ￿rst
concerns the fact that some papers set o⁄ the monopolistic distortions with subsidies in the steady-
state, but these subsidies are di⁄erent in the cooperative and in the Nash case. The second problem
derives from the fact that ￿ exible prices can be a source of volatility. Actually, they can account for
more volatility than a sticky-price model. Therefore, when those models measure stability gains in
comparison with the ￿ exible price case, they do not disaggregate the e⁄ects of the volatility in the
mean from the stabilization e⁄ect.
To be more precise, in this literature (Benigno and Woodford (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2007),
Forlati (2007) among others) gains are transformed in losses from a target level and can be described
as follows:
Loss = ￿(b yt ￿ e yt)
2 + ￿￿2
t + ￿ (b pt ￿ e pt)
2 + t:i:p:
where b xt ￿ e xt represents the deviation of each variable from its target level, y is output, p represent
terms-of-trade, ￿ the in￿ ation rate and t:i:p are terms independent of policy. Usually, target in￿ ation
rate is zero.
Hence, when measuring stability gains as the gain that would occur if the economy could reach
the ￿ exible price case, they do not evaluate the true stabilization gain. However, the problem arrives
because they can overestimate or underestimate the true stabilization gain depending on the target
and the type of the model they are considering. Actually, if we consider the stabilization gain to be
the gain that would emerge from a realization of a shock coming from a certain distribution, this
methodology is not able to replicate the true stochastic gain.
The work of Benigno and Woodford (2005) is related to those aspects. In fact, in their work they
show how a LQ problem of a model with distortionary taxation and monopolistic distortions can be
derived in order to take into account the e⁄ects of stabilization, characterized by the variances of
endogenous variables. They consider the conditions under which price stability is optimal and they
conclude that the introduction of tax distortions (production tax) does not create an extra channel,
it only a⁄ects the weights on these objectives and the proper de￿nition of the output target.
Gali and Monacelli (2007) present a model where the Monetary Union is made up of a continuum
of countries and lump-sum taxes exist. In their framework, labor subsidies are introduced so as to
cancel out monopolistic distortions in the steady-state, with the purpose of recreating an e¢ cient
￿ exible-price equilibrium8. They use the "Linear Quadratic Method", where they compare two types
of policies: the optimal cooperative policy and the non-coordinated policy. In the optimal cooperative
policy, in￿ ation is stabilized at the union level (with monetary policy) and ￿scal policy is only used
for stabilization of asymmetric shocks. Again, the idea is that ￿scal policy decisions remain at the
7Cooperative, Nash and First Best.
8With these characteristics the model could be solved with the "Lognormal Distribution Method", since it allows for
a closed form solution.
9national level but countries act simultaneously posing no in￿ ationary pressure on the union. In the
non-coordinated policy, they conclude that joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome forcing the
Central Bank to choose between in￿ ation and output gap stabilization at the union level. In their
work, they are interested in analyzing the stabilization of the main aggregates towards the e¢ cient
allocation (that is characterized by the ￿ exible price case) in these two types of policies.
Another point worth mentioning is that these authors pay little attention to quantifying the gain
derived from achieving coordination, that is, the loss reduction from moving from a non-coordinated
policy to the optimal cooperative policy. These authors conclude that gains are "quantitatively small",
but give no comment on this quanti￿cation. Moreover, considering that coordination gains are the
di⁄erence from the stabilization gains that occur under coordination and non-coordination, it would
be relevant to analyze the origin of its magnitude.
Another question that arises is that these di⁄erences are only in deviations from the steady-state,
not accounting for deterministic di⁄erences. Even cancelling out monopolistic distortions with a
constant labor subsidy is not su¢ cient to obtain a comparable situation between the Nash and the
cooperative steady-states. They rationalize it because it allows to simultaneously o⁄set the market
power and the terms of trade externality. However, we notice that this subsidy di⁄ers in the cooperative
and in the Nash situations, and it is, per se, an instrument that is not taken into consideration when
computing the total of the cooperative gains, since terms of trade are a source of spillovers that
in￿ uence gains from stabilization.
In a similar setup, Forlati (2007) compares the case of coordination, where a common authority
chooses timeless optimal monetary and ￿scal policies, with the case of non-coordination, where ￿scal
authorities are not coordinated neither among each other, nor with the Central Bank. Although not
computing the gain from moving from one situation to the other, she makes a careful explanation
on how di⁄erences in the intertemporal elasticities of private and public consumption may generate
di⁄erences in the reaction of the aggregates following a technology or a markup shock.
However, her analysis is very similar to Gali and Monacelli in what entails the method (LQ)
and the particulars of the model used. Therefore, when computing the coordinated equilibrium,
she considers that the target for stabilization is the ￿rst best because she imposes a subsidy on
production to eliminate the monopoly distortions9. In the non-coordination situation, the target for
the ￿scal authorities is the ￿ exible price allocation under ￿ oating exchange rates. Therefore, if she
were to compute the stabilization gain, it would be the gain obtained by the approximation of each
allocation to their respective target in both situations (coordination and non-coordination), and the
coordination gain would be the gain from moving from a situation of non-coordination to a situation
of coordination. As regards the stabilization procedure, she shows that the ine¢ cient steady-state
distribution of resources across private and public consumption generates ine¢ cient variations in
output. That is, as ￿scal policymakers can a⁄ect the terms of trade in the steady-state, this leads to
distortions when reacting to shocks.
Gali and Monacelli (2007) and Forlati (2007) claim that one important extension would be to
9However, as proved in Salvado (2009), the introduction of a labor subsidy is not su¢ cient to achieve the First Best.
10include distortionary taxation and study the reaction to shocks, which give us another reason to
introduce labor income taxes in our model.
Ferrero (2007) also uses this LQ approach but does not consider a coordinated ￿scal policy. In
fact, he considers that there is a common monetary policy, but ￿scal policy is uncoordinated. This
author does not eliminate markup distortions from his model, and considers only a distortionary tax
on production. The objective of this work is to compute the welfare costs of policies that aim to
achieve strict price stability and are constrained by a balanced budget requirement. The conclusions
that he takes from the model are the same as the above two authors: in the optimal equilibrium,
monetary policy is used to achieve price stability through a ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting rule and ￿scal
policy is used to stabilize asymmetric shocks through changes in government debt. However, as he
introduces distortionary taxation, he can go a step further in obtaining an extra channel of e⁄ects. He
shows that optimal ￿scal policy must take into account the intratemporal response to in￿ ation among
countries as well as the intertemporal smoothing of tax distortions via changes in terms of trade.
From a numerical point of view, Ferrero measures the welfare gain of pursuing debt stabilization.
He shows that the relative gain10 of obtaining monetary stabilization is about 1.17% and the relative
gain11 of pursuing ￿scal stabilization is 42.4% which, in consumption equivalents12, represents 7.58%
and 4.42%, respectively. That is, monetary policy has a small impact on the real side of the economy,
but ￿scal policy, by moving from balanced budget rules to optimal ￿ exible debt targeting, improves
welfare. Nonetheless, notice that these stabilization gains are not in line with the aim of the present
paper.
Benigno and Benigno (2006), compute the gains from monetary cooperation. They do not introduce
￿scal policy in this work, and just consider the existence of a tax on sales that o⁄set the monopolistic
distortion in the steady state. They show that, in general, there are gains from monetary cooperation
because of the existence of the externality on terms of trade.
Beetsma and Jensen (2005), follow a setup identical to Gali and Monacelli. However, the method
for analyzing the stabilization gains is somewhat di⁄erent. These authors consider that the Union
may solve the following two problems: i) a full optimization problem where the Union simultaneously
chooses the monetary policy (through interest rate deviations) and the ￿scal policy of each country
(through government spending deviations from a ￿ exible-prices scenario); ii) a problem where the ￿scal
policy is passive and the Union merely chooses the monetary policy. Fiscal stabilization gains derive
from the di⁄erence in welfare between the two scenarios. One of the main conclusions of these authors
is that, because ￿ uctuations depend only on the di⁄erences in shocks between the two countries,
welfare di⁄erences are proportional to the relative shock variance. In their benchmark parametrized
case, ￿scal stabilization gains represent 0.42% in consumption equivalents. They also study the e⁄ect
in changing some of the parameters and conclude that stabilization gains varies as a result of relative
price changes. Moreover, relative prices increase with the reduction of labor-supply elasticity because
the ￿ uctuations in production e⁄ort associated with relative price movements are more costly. They
10The gain is relative to the case of pursuing a strict price stability rule.
11The gain is relative to the case of pursuing a strict price stability rule.
12Of the nominal private consumption expenditure per capita in 2005, in the United States.
11also increase with i) the elasticity of government-spending, since it allows for more active relative ￿scal
policy responses; ii) with a reduction in the consumption share, as it reduces the share of output that
is sensitive to relative price movements; and, ￿nally, iii) with the increase in price rigidity, because it
increases the role of stabilization policies.
Summarizing the above, the purpose of the present paper is to allow for the measurement of total
cooperation gains (both deterministic gains and stochastic) in a manner equivalent to the ￿rst group of
authors above mentioned, but with the ability to use more complex models similar to those used by the
second group of authors. Opposed to the ￿rst group of authors, the methodology used, as described
below, allows for a simpler computation of coordination gains as well as for a clearer separation of
such gains from stabilization gains.
3 The Economy
The world has two identical countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F) that have the same technology
and market structure. Each country is populated by a continuum of equal consumers with size one.
Consumption is composed by two traded goods, one produced domestically and the other produced
abroad. The production of each good is linear and only depends on labor, which is immobile across
countries. Technology is a random variable which can take di⁄erent realizations in each country.
Fiscal policy is characterized by a tax rate on labor and by government expenditures that are welfare
improving. Monetary policy is set by a common Central Bank.
3.1 The Households
















where Ct, Nt denote private consumption and labor and Gt public consumption. We assume that
in the case of the foreign country, these variables are denoted by a star (for example C￿
t is private
consumption in country F).
We use this type of utility function13 because it is the one found in the majority of the literature
(Gali and Monacelli (2006), Beetsma and Jensen (2005), among others) allowing for a direct compari-
son of results. Additionally, as we will explain later, this utility function simpli￿es our understanding
in the di⁄erences of the spillovers from the ￿ exible price case and the sticky price case. In the ￿ ex-
ible price case, technology shocks do not a⁄ect directly labor. Therefore, di⁄erences in welfare are
just driven from di⁄erences in private and public consumption. As the later two variables appear in
logarithms in the utility function, the e⁄ect of the technology shocks in the cooperative gain can be
linearly decomposed. However, when prices are sticky, labor will change with technology and hence
cooperative gains are no longer linear in technology.
13Particularly, with an additive structure in the logarithm of C and G and also depending on hours.





























The elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent varieties of a given good is given by ￿ > 1. We
assume that this parameter is the same for the two aggregate goods15.
As we choose to study identical countries and aggregate consumption is a Cobb-Douglas function
it signi￿cantly simpli￿es the exercise.
3.1.1 Demand Functions and Price Indexes







































1￿￿ and the price







1￿￿. Since this two economies belong
to a Monetary Union and all goods are tradeable, we have that PHt = P￿
Ht and PFt = P￿
Ft.
Additionally, from the optimal allocation of goods in each country and from the domestic price









15For the foreign country, C
￿




















































































PHt represent the terms of trade between country F and country H.
3.1.2 Households Problem
We consider the timing as in Lucas (1982). At the beginning of period t, households in country H
hold nominal wealth Wt. In the asset markets, households can trade nominal balances, Mt, noncon-
tingent debt issued by the two countries BHt+BFt and private state-contingent debt Et fQt;t+1Bt+1g.
The price of this last asset is Qt;t+1, that represents the price at date t when the state of the world is
st, of a bond paying one unit of currency at date t + 1 if the state of the world is st+1. Thus,
Mt + BHt + BFt + Et fQt;t+1Bt+1g ￿ Wt
Afterwards, goods markets open and households buy consumption goods, restricted to the following
cash-in-advance constraint:
PtCt ￿ Mt
Finally, at the end of period t, they receive labor income net of taxes, (1 ￿ ￿t)WtNt, seigniorage




all asset returns. Therefore, wealth in the beginning of next period is:
Wt+1 = Mt + (BHt + BFt)Rt + Bt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)WtNt + Zt +
1 Z
0
￿t (i)di ￿ PtCt
where Rt is the return of non-contingent assets.
Therefore, in country H households choose fCt;Nt;Mt+1;BHt+1;BFt+1;Bt+2g
1
t=0 in order to max-
imize its utility (given by equation (4)), subject to the following budget constraint,
PtCt + Mt+1 + BHt+1 + BFt+1 + Et+1 fQt+1;t+2Bt+2g ￿




and to the cash-in-advance condition:
PtCt ￿ Mt
14The problem of the households in country F is identical.
From the ￿rst order conditions of the households problem we obtain the Euler equation (17), the










; t ￿ 0 (18)
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; t ￿ 0 (19)
From equations (17) and (18) and taking expectations we can observe as usually that Rt = 1
EtQt;t+1.
Since we consider a monetary environment, the cash-in-advance constraint imposes a monetary
cost on consumption, as it is shown in the presence of Rt in equation (19). As such, this condition is
di⁄erent from the usual one found in cashless economies models.
3.2 The Firms
In country H; each ￿rm has the following production function:
Yt (i) = AtNt (i) (20)
where Yt (i) is the production of good i that can be used for private consumption in the home and
in the foreign country (CHt, C￿
Ht) and for public consumption in the home country (Gt). At is an
aggregate technology shock. Country F has an analogous production function (Y ￿




t (j) can be used for private consumption in the home and in the foreign country (CFt, C￿
Ft)
and for public consumption in the foreign country (G￿
t).
3.2.1 Price setting
Firms are assumed to set prices one period in advance, that is, whatever the realization of the
productivity, prices remain unchanged for one period.
In country H they choose, at t ￿ 1, the price PHt (i) in order to maximize the expected value













(PHt (i)Yt (i) ￿ WtNt (i))
￿
As we consider that all ￿rms are equal, they all set the same price:























16The price of pro￿ts in period t is characterized by Qt￿1;tQt;t+1 which is the same as Qt￿1;t+1. That is, pro￿ts are
received in the end of the period t (represented by t ￿ 1) and are used for consumption one period later (t + 1).
15In the special case of ￿ exible prices, the price chosen contemporaneously by ￿rms is a constant
markup over marginal costs:






In country F, ￿rms face an identical problem.
3.3 National Fiscal Authorities
The ￿scal authority in the home country taxes labor income at the rate ￿. The period by period
budget constraint of the home ￿scal authority is:
￿tWtNt + BHt+1 = PHtGt + BHtRt (24)
where Gt represent public consumption.












Notice that for the representation of all the noncontingent debt in both economies we only need
three variables: BHt, BFt and B￿
Ft
17.
For any given level of Gt, the government of country H optimizes the expenditures across national







Later we will suppose that the government will have a balanced budget in each period, therefore
in￿nite accumulation of debt can be ruled out.
3.4 Central Monetary Authority











to the two countries.




￿ Ct + C￿
t (26)
3.5 Market Clearing
For each state of the world and date t, we have the following market clearing conditions:
￿ Goods market:
Yt(i) = CHt (i) + C￿
Ht (i) + Gt (i) (27)
Y ￿
t (j) = CFt (j) + C￿
Ft (j) + G￿
t (j) (28)
17The inclusion of the variable B
￿
Ht is irrelevant because we can trace all the debt ￿ ows between the two countries
from the other three variables.


























￿ Risk free nominal bonds market:
Z 1
0




Ft (j)dj = 0 (31)
￿ State contingent nominal bonds market:
Z 1
0




t (j)dj = 0 (32)
4 Aggregate Demand
From the clearing of the market of good i in country H and equations (8), (10), (12), (14) and
(25) we obtain:
Yt(i) = CHt (i) + C￿














t ) + Gt
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￿￿1 is the aggregate output index for country H.











t ) + G￿
t (34)
5 Flexible price equilibrium
From the market clearing conditions (equations (27) and (28)), the two government budget con-




































17Using the above expressions we obtain the price ratio as a function of technology, labor and tax










￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿t
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
t
(37)
In this model, we have incomplete markets because assets that are traded among countries (BH,
BF and B￿
F) are not state contingent. However, a strategy to solve our model is to consider no initial
debt.
Lemma 1 If state contingent nominal bonds could be traded across countries, considering that both
countries have in moment t = 0 zero debt, the model generates consumption risk sharing.





















Using both actualized households budget constraint combined with ￿rms￿ s pro￿t, considering that in





























t [￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
t] + B￿
F0





















Proposition 2 For the de￿ned structure, considering identical countries is equivalent to consider that
the current account is always balanced.
Proof. From Lemma (1) we have consumption risk sharing and from demand equations there is
balanced trade in each period,
C￿





















18Hence, in each period debt is not traded. Therefore, the non-existence of contingent debt is irrelevant
for the equilibrium.
Using expressions (35) and (36) and knowing that Ct = C￿
t we obtain the price ratio and the










Therefore, di⁄erences in the terms of trade are due to di⁄erences in technology, labor and the labor
tax chosen by each country of the union.
Combining the labor supply condition and the foreign counterpart with equations (37) and (39),
after some algebra, we obtain an expression for labor as a function of the home tax rate, that does
not depend on technology shocks. This implies that, changes in labor are just due to changes in the
tax rates. This occurs because we consider a separable (log) utility function.
Nt =
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿t)








(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿￿
t)





Then, the consumption allocations are given by:
Ct =





t)[(1 ￿ ￿t)(1 ￿ ￿￿
t)]
1





Notice that, Ct = C￿
t .
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For a given value of MU
t and from the equilibrium allocations Ct and C￿
t , we can derive the price








As ￿scal policy is based on taxes on labor income, di⁄erences in production due to asymmetric
technology shocks are totally absorbed by government consumption, which is not traded among coun-
tries. Additionally, as we do not allow for government debt, this means that all the variability of the
shock is going to be absorbed in that period and hence, real government consumption will not be
smoothed over time. As the value of government expenditures is going to be smoothed that justi￿es
our imposition of zero government debt. That is, relative prices allow for the smoothing of private
consumption, labor and the value of government expenditures.
195.1 Monetary authority decision
The central monetary authority is going to choose monetary policy independent of the way ￿scal
authorities choose tax rates. Therefore, we consider that the interest rate is exogenous for both ￿scal
problems. Hence, our measure of cooperative gains is transversal to the strategic interaction among
the monetary and ￿scal authorities. Since for most of the exercise we are interested in the optimum,
we consider for this model an equilibrium interest rate constant and equal to zero (in our case Rt = 1).
5.2 Fiscal policy
Lemma 3 When consumption and government expenditures are additive in logarithms in the utility
function, the optimal cooperative equilibrium in the ￿exible price economy is characterized by policy
instruments (￿t;￿￿
t) that are independent of the technology shocks.
Proof. As seen in equations (40) to (45) the equilibrium allocations are multiplicative in At and A￿
t.
Hence, each country￿ s utility function can be written as the sum of two main parts. The ￿rst one
depends on both tax rates and the second one only depends on the technology shocks and parameters.
Therefore, the utility of country H19 can be decomposed as,
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[ln(1 ￿ ￿) + ln(￿ ￿ 1)] +
+￿ ln(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ln(￿)
Hence, the Union￿ s Utility can be written as
UU







Therefore, in both problems (Nash and Cooperative) maximizing the utility in order to the tax rates
is equivalent to maximizing the ￿rst component of the utility. Hence optimal tax rates (￿t;￿￿
t) do not
depend on the technology shocks.
5.2.1 The cooperative equilibrium
Having determined the equilibrium of the economy that depends on (￿t;￿￿
t), we compute here the
￿scal cooperative equilibrium which corresponds to the equilibrium when the ￿scal policy is chosen op-











20timally by a central authority. The objective is to compare this equilibrium with the Nash equilibrium
and measure the welfare gain of moving from the decentralized to the coordinated ￿scal policy.
When national ￿scal policy is coordinated among the two countries, it is as if there was a central















s:t: eq (40) to (45)
Proposition 4 With ￿exible prices, optimal ￿scal policy instruments are constant across states.
Therefore, utility deviations from the steady-state equilibrium can be written as,
c UU











Proof. After some simpli￿cations to the ￿rst order conditions of the cooperative problem, the cooper-
ative equilibrium is determined by the tax rate ￿C
t = ￿￿C
t = ￿C, constant across dates and states, that
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’ + 1
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[￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿C]
2 = 0 (47)
Notice that this Lemma occurs because this problem aggregates two important features: a separable
utility function (logarithmic) and an unitary elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
Notice that, as the utility function is logarithmic in consumption and government expenditures,
and as labor allocations does not depend on shocks, the optimal cooperative tax rate is constant.
5.2.2 The Nash Equilibrium
The ￿scal authority of country H is going to choose the tax rate ￿ that maximizes the utility of






s:t: eq (40); (42) and (44)







s:t: eq (41); (42) and (45)
Proposition 5 With ￿exible prices, the ￿scal policy instruments in the Nash equilibrium are constant















21Proof. Applying the same procedure as before, the Nash equilibrium is the tax rate ￿N
t = ￿￿N
t = ￿N
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[￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿N]
2 = 0
Notice again that the value of the optimal tax rate is constant over the time and states.
The same reasoning as in the cooperative equilibrium applies here. That is, as the utility function
is logarithmic in consumption and government expenditures, and as labor allocations does not depend
on shocks, the optimal Nash tax rates are independent of shocks.
5.2.3 Comparing the Cooperative with the Nash
Proposition 6 With ￿exible prices, stabilization gain is zero.
Proof. From equations (46) and (48) we can write the stabilization gain as a function that does not
depend on policy instruments.








t;A;A￿) ￿ d UN
2 (At;A￿
t;A;A￿) = 0
For the functional forms used and with ￿ exible prices, optimal tax rates are not state contin-
gent, which generates inexistence of ￿scal coordination gains in a stochastic environment. As such,
￿scal coordination gains are identical to the deterministic case. As, in the steady-state those tax rates
are di⁄erent in the cooperative and the Nash equilibrium, there exist a deterministic gain. Moreover,
as we saw di⁄erences among the two equilibria derive from di⁄erences in optimal labor, private and
government consumption.
To quantify the gains we use standard parameter values considered in the literature. That is, we
consider a labor supply elasticity of 2, which implies that ’ = 1
2 and a markup over marginal costs of
1:2 which implies that ￿ = 6. Additionally, we consider ￿ = 0:25, which is coincident with the average
ratio of government expenditures over GDP in major developed economies.
Observing ￿gure 1, it is evident that, for identical shocks in both countries, the di⁄erence between
the cooperative and the Nash equilibrium is constant for each level of the technology shock. As this
di⁄erence is the same for each A, we call it deterministic gain.
Notice that obtaining e¢ cient results is not an objective of the present work, since the introduction
of just distortionary taxes without any kind of other compensation achieves a trivial ine¢ cient result.
Hence, we are not interested in explaining the di⁄erence between the cooperative equilibrium and the
￿rst-best that is present in ￿gure 1.
5.2.4 Results
Table 1 represents the tax rates and the cooperative gains for a given symmetric (A = A￿ = e)
shock. Deterministic gains of moving from a competitive tax system into a cooperative tax system
represent an increase of 16:8% in total Union￿ s utility and 17:42% in consumption equivalents.
22Figure 1: Union￿ s utility in the Cooperative, Nash and First Best equilibria for di⁄erent levels of the
technology shock (A = A￿).
Cooperative Nash Utility Gain
Consumption
Equivalents
￿C= ￿￿C ￿N= ￿￿N UUC
￿UUN
UUN %
A = A￿= e 27:87% 46:53% 16:8% 17:42%
Table 1: Cooperative and Nash results under ￿ exible prices
These gains occur because when ￿scal policy is chosen independently, each country has an incentive
to increase its tax rate in order to reduce the labor e⁄ort. As such, we observe that in the Nash
equilibrium the tax rate is higher than in the cooperative equilibrium. As a result, in the Nash case
private consumption is smaller and public consumption is higher. Even obtaining equality in the terms
of trade (because the two countries have the same characteristics), there is an higher level of prices in
both countries20.
We have also performed this analysis with di⁄erent parameter values. In ￿gure 2, we observe that
deterministic gains increase with the elasticity of labor supply. That is, when agents become more
elastic in their decisions between labor and leisure, the gain is going to increase. In other words, as this
elasticity increases, the amount of labor increases which, in turn, will a⁄ect relative prices. Thus, from
a coordination point of view, this change in relative prices leads to an higher incentive in changing
terms of trade between the two countries resulting in an overall increase in the Union￿ s utility gain
when compared with the Nash equilibrium.
In ￿gure 3 we observe that coordination gains are not monotonic with the private consumption
share (1￿￿) represented in the utility function. We verify that, for the low-end range, that is, for very
high shares of private consumption, an increase in gamma will lead to an increase in the deterministic
gain. This is so because, as we increase gamma, we increase the importance of public expenditure
in the utility, thereby increasing the distortion between the cooperative and the Nash equilibrium.
However, this link is reversed at ￿ = 0:3, the point in which public expenditure represents 27:48%
of total consumption. Therefore, once private consumption becomes less then 72:52%, deterministic
20See scenario 6 in ￿gure 7, in appendix A.1.
23coordination gains have a decreasing connection with ￿, given that the positive e⁄ect of the distortion
is more than o⁄-set by the negative e⁄ect of the increase in the Government￿ s relative weight.
We also present the behavior of deterministic cooperative gains for di⁄erent markup-over-marginal-
cost levels. In ￿gure 4 we observe one of the most discussed ideas in literature: as the market distortion
reduces, i.e., as the markup converges towards 1, coordination gains become smaller. It should be
noted that, even in this case, we continue to have substantial coordination gains. This is so because,
as previously discussed, this model incorporates distortionary taxes. On the other hand, we may
also observe that for plausible markup-over-marginal-cost values, increasing deterministic cooperation,
gains occur. This happens because, the higher the markup, the greater the distortion on relative prices,
which generates a higher deterministic gain. Therefore, we can conclude that deterministic gains are
very sensitive to changes in markup values, when compared to changes in the other parameters.
We also perform some sensitive analysis for di⁄erent risk aversion values. To do so, we apply the
above methodology to the following utility function:










Figure 5 plots the deterministic gains in terms of the Union￿ s utility for di⁄erent risk aversion levels.
We observe that, as risk aversion increases, gains decrease, implying that the di⁄erence between the
cooperative solution and the Nash solution fades away. Therefore, coordination does not act as risk
compensation.
6 Prices set in advance
The model used above is very clear in delivering results since it has a closed form solution.
However, it lacks one of the characteristics common in the literature: the presence of nominal rigidities.
As such, in this section, we consider that ￿rms set prices on period in advance, introducing the rigidity
that was absent in our framework.
6.1 Solving the competitive equilibrium
Combining the labor supply (equation (19)) with the labor demand obtained when prices are
set one period in advance (equation (21)), after some algebra we obtain the following price setting












































21We still consider that Rt = 1.
24Figure 2: Deterministic gain for di⁄erent values of the labor supply elasticity.
Figure 3: Deterministic gain for di⁄erent consumption shares.
Figure 4: Deterministic gain for di⁄erent markup levels.
25Figure 5: Deterministic gain for di⁄erent levels of risk aversion.
From the aggregate demand equations and the government budget constraints, we obtain the















































And ￿nally, we use Lemma 1 to consider consumption risk sharing and we assume that money











= Cs + C￿
s; 8s (54)
Hence, the equilibrium will be composed by equations (49), (50), and equations (51), (52), (53)
and (54) (one for each state).
Notice that the symmetric situation that we derived in the ￿ exible price case does not apply here.
Now, Ns will be di⁄erent from N￿
s, and as a result, in the sticky price equilibrium we will have an
extra channel of e⁄ects. For example, in the presence of a negative shock, individuals will work harder
and the impact of the shock will be ampli￿ed through the distortionary e⁄ects of the tax.
6.2 The cooperative equilibrium
The central authority is going to maximize the sum of the equally weighted agents￿utility in
order to choose the two tax rates in each state (￿s;￿￿
s). As equilibrium allocations derive from the
solution of the system of equations (49) to (54), we must include them in this problem, and this way
the central ￿scal authority is going to choose the two tax rates and (PH;PF;Cs;C￿
s;Ns;N￿
s)8s.
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s:t: eq 49 to 54
The solution to this problem is quite di⁄erent from the solution in the ￿ exible price case. When
prices were ￿ exible we saw that, in equilibrium, labor did not change with technology because the
substitution and the income e⁄ects where completely o⁄set due to the functional forms chosen in
the exercise. However, when prices are set one period in advance, even with the particulars of those
functional forms, we obtain a response of labor to technology. For example, in the presence of a positive
shock in both countries, we observe that labor is reduced. Now, ex-post real wage is higher from its
ex-ante value22. Households should work harder to obtain the most of the shock. Additionally, the
common ￿scal policymaker increases taxes to increase government consumption. Private consumption
increases but is smoothed across states.
6.3 The Nash Equilibrium
In the Nash equilibrium, the ￿scal authority of each country is going to choose its policy instrument
in order to maximize the expected value of utility, independent from the choice of the other country.
However, as in this case we cannot write the equilibrium allocations explicitly, we include all the
equations that de￿ne the equilibrium as restrictions to each country￿ s problem.











s:t: eq 49 to 54













s:t: eq 49 to 54
22It is also higher than the wage rate in the ￿ exible price case.
27State Probability Shock in H Shock in F
s = 1 ￿1 A1 A￿
1
s = 2 ￿2 A2 A￿
2
s = 3 ￿3 A3 A￿
3
Table 2: Distribution of shocks
The solution to this Nash problem will be given by combining all ￿rst order conditions of the above
de￿ned two maximization problems. Notice that the subset of the ￿rst order conditions of country
H￿ s problem represents its reaction function, and the same is true for country F.
The Nash equilibrium has the characteristics of the cooperative equilibrium mainly in what con-
cerns the reaction of labor to shocks and the smoothing of consumption across states. However,
compared to the cooperative equilibrium, there is an extra e⁄ect that derives from the strategic in-
teraction of both ￿scal policymakers. The rationale is the following: as each policymaker does not
consider the e⁄ects of changing their own tax rate in the other country￿ s policy, in the margin he
increases its tax rate in order to reduce labor (that creates disutility) and increase government con-
sumption. This increase in the tax rate creates an upward pressure of terms of trade in each country.
However, in the Nash equilibrium, considering cases with symmetric shocks, terms-of-trade do not
change and, in the end, the result is welfare-reducing for both countries.
6.4 Comparing the Cooperative with the Nash solution
Using the same parametrization as in the ￿ exible price case and considering several distributions
of shocks, we can compute the cooperative gains when prices are set one period in advance.
For simplicity, we consider that technology shocks follow a generic discrete distribution with 3
states of nature, described in table 2.
As described in the introduction, the gain in the Union￿ s utility can be decomposed in two main
components: the deterministic gain and a pure stochastic gain, the later being equivalent to the
cooperative gain in deviations from the steady-state.
Pure Stochastic Gain = Total Gain - Deterministic Gain
where
Deterministic Gain = UUC
steady state ￿ UUN
steady state






In table 3 we report the results for some scenarios, considering that ￿1 = 0:75 and ￿2 = ￿3 = 0:125.
We use the replication of the deterministic case, as a benchmark. We observe that it captures the same
equilibrium results of the ￿ exible price case. Moreover, we observe that stochastic gains represent
between 1:44% and 0:2% of total gains, which in consumption equivalents, represent an increase
between 0:03 and 0:19 percentage points, in relation to the deterministic gain. Additionally, we observe
that stochastic gains are identical in scenario 1 (symmetric shocks) and 2 (asymmetric shocks), with
the following particulars:
28Cooperative Nash Deterministic gain
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Table 3: Deterministic and Stochastic Cooperative Gains
￿ both economies su⁄er a negative shock in one state (s = 2) and a positive shock in another
(s = 3), and
￿ country H su⁄ers a negative shock and country F su⁄ers a positive shock in state 2 and vice-versa
in state 3.
This occurs because the mean of the distribution of shocks is una⁄ected and as we are considering
that prices are set one period in advance, the reaction of one given country to a shock is independent
from the other country￿ s shock. Ex-ante, countries do not have the information of the shock that is
going to happen, and since these shocks are iid, prices are the same for the same shock. Therefore,
policy a⁄ects terms of trade just by the mean of marginal costs and not by strategic redistribution.
Proposition 7 Symmetric technology shocks lead to coordination gains with the same magnitude of
asymmetric ones with similar mean.
In ￿gure 6 we disaggregate total cooperative gains into deterministic and stochastic components
for each state of the world in the case of a symmetric and a asymmetric shock. In the ￿rst panel
we report the results for the symmetric shock named scenario 1 with the baseline parametrization in
29table 3. That is, it depicts the gains that would have happened in a given state. Those gains are very
di⁄erent from what we would obtain had we considered the repetition of each state independently.
We observe that, in each state of the world, the stochastic component is not so small as it appears
on average. For example, when s = 2, the absolute value of the stochastic component accounts for
￿149% of the deterministic component and when s = 3 this percentage goes up to 111%. It is also
important to notice that negative stochastic gains derive from both economies reaction to a bad state,
which in this scenario is represented by state s = 2.
In the case of an asymmetric shock, represented by scenario 2, in the second panel of ￿gure 6 we
observe that in both states 2 and 3, stochastic gains are small, but negative. However, when both
countries face an asymmetric shock with the same expected value, the average result of the stochastic
component is positive and equal to the case of an equivalent23 symmetric shock.
Figure 6: Deterministic and stochastic gains of cooperation in case of a symmetric (scenario 1) and
asymmetric shock (scenario 2).
On the other hand, when we look to scenario 3 (in table 3), where one country su⁄ers a negative
shock in both states and the other su⁄ers a positive shock, we verify that the stochastic gain, albeit
being smaller (0:82%) still exists. Hence, even changing the mean of the distribution of shocks in favor
of coordination, we still obtain a stochastic gain.
7 Conclusions
In a Monetary Union where monetary stabilization instruments are lost at the country level, the
question is how ￿scal instruments should be used as means to stabilize shocks that have asymmetric
transmissions throughout the Union.
In this paper we develop a simple methodology to measure gains from ￿scal cooperation and to
separate these gains in two parts: the deterministic and the stochastic gain. We show that deterministic
￿scal coordination gains are positive and signi￿cative and stochastic coordination gains are very small
namely when compared to deterministic ones. Moreover, the dimension of the stochastic gain does
23Equivalent meaning that both shocks have the same expected value.
30not change signi￿cantly if shocks are symmetric or asymmetric. As shown by Lucas (1988), normal
risk aversion levels generate small stabilization gains. Hence, we conclude that stabilization ￿scal
policies should be conducted from a decentralized institutional environment, although the existence
of a supranational institution can be sustained in order to coordinate the deterministic component of
those policies.
In the next paper we continue this line of investigation studying the robustness of these ￿ndings
to models where we introduce a Calvo price setting and therefore measure stabilization gains in an
environment where shocks and policies have persistent e⁄ects.
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33Figure 7: Allocation values for di⁄erent scenarios.
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